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We develop an empirical discrete choice model that explicitly al-
lows for endogenous social interactions. We analyze the issues of mul-
tiple equilibria, statistical coherency, and estimation of the model by
means of simulation methods. In an empirical application, we analyze
a data set containing information on the individual behavior of some
8000 high school teenagers from almost 500 diﬀerent school classes.
We estimate the model for ﬁve types of teen discrete choice behav-
ior: Smoking, truanting, moped ownership, cell phone ownership, and
asking parents’ permission for purchases. We ﬁnd strong social interac-
tion eﬀects for behavior closely related to school (truanting), somewhat
weaker social interaction eﬀects for behavior partly related to school
(smoking, moped and cell phone ownership) and no social interaction
eﬀects for behavior far away from school (asking parents’ permission
for purchases). Intra-gender interactions are generally much stronger
than cross-gender interactions.
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11 Introduction
Early contributions by Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), Leibenstein (1950),
Pollak (1976), and others show that economists have recognized the poten-
tial importance of social interactions for a long time. Yet, is it only recently
that researchers have begun attempts to measure social interactions empir-
ically.
The slow rate of accumulation of empirical analyses on social interactions
is related to several diﬃculties. One important problem is identiﬁcation. If
one observes a correlation between peers, it is generally diﬃcult to distin-
guish between genuine endogenous social eﬀects (e.g. two pupils have high
grades because they are mutually motivated by the high grades of the other
pupil) and other social eﬀects (e.g. two pupils in a class have high grades
because they have the same teacher); cf. Manski (1993, 2000).
A second problem is that a person’s reference group – the group of in-
dividuals to which (s)he attaches nonzero weights in making decisions – is
usually not easily determined. Alessie and Kapteyn (1991), Kapteyn et al.
(1997), and Aronsson et al. (1999) deﬁne the reference group of an indi-
vidual as the group of all persons in the population within the same age
group and with the same education level. A more attractive alternative
is to use subjective information on an individual’s reference group, as in
Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998). However, their information on the members
of the reference group of a sampled individual is limited as these reference
group members are not themselves included in the sample. Once a reference
group has been deﬁned there is a potential endogeneity problem as people
may self-select into reference groups. Failure to control for this may bias
estimated endogenous social interaction eﬀects.
The primary methodological aim of this paper is to contribute to a so-
lution of yet another problem: Many variables of interest in research on
social interactions are discrete, with smoking being a prominent example.
2In a discrete choice model with endogenous social interactions, the choices
of other individuals are explanatory variables in the equation describing the
choice behavior of a given individual. For estimation and other purposes,
the reduced form (or “social equilibrium” or “solution”) of the model is re-
quired. While the reduced form is straightforwardly obtained in a linear
model with continuous variables, its derivation is more complicated in the
case of discrete variables. As already noted by authors analyzing the simul-
taneous probit model (see e.g. Heckman, 1978 and Maddala, 1983), such
models may not have a solution or may have multiple solutions. This in turn
may yield problems regarding the statistical coherency of the model. Exist-
ing empirical studies allowing for social interactions usually focus on choices
characterized by continuous variables, such as consumption and savings, or
have analyzed discrete choices on an aggregated level; see e.g. Glaeser et al.
(1996). An exception is Gaviria and Raphael (2001), who analyze school-
based peer eﬀects in the individual discrete choice behavior of tenth-graders.
However, their econometric model ignores multiplicity of equilibria.
In Section 2 we present a model based on the assumption that observed
choices represent an equilibrium of a static discrete game played by all in-
teracting agents. We analyze the issues of multiple equilibria and statistical
coherency. Section 3 discusses estimation of the model by means of a simu-
lation method.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to an empirical application. We
analyze a sample of almost 500 high school classes with detailed information
on the individual behavior of the pupils within each class. We take the class
as the natural reference group for each pupil within that class. On a weekday
the average pupil in our sample spends about six hours in his or her school
class. The total time spent on school related activities (including commuting
and homework) is about eight hours per weekday, more than ﬁfty percent of
the daily waking time. While teenage behavior is obviously also inﬂuenced
3by persons outside the class, class mates are likely to play a dominant role
in shaping teenagers’ preferences and behaviors. Moreover, with classes as
reference groups the importance of contextual eﬀects (behavior is inﬂuenced
by exogenous charateristics of peers) is likely to be limited, as the pupils in
a class share many exogenous characteristics. Also, as noted by Gaviria and
Raphael (2001), pupils are probably less exposed to the family background
of their class peers than to the family background of neighborhood peers.
Since in principle all pupils in a sampled class are interviewed, the current
data set has unusually rich information on the behavior of all members of a
sampled individual’s reference group.
Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5we estimate the model to ana-
lyze ﬁve types of teen discrete choice behavior: Smoking, truanting, moped
ownership, cell phone ownership, and asking parents’ permission for pur-
chases. To control for sorting into schools and omitted variables that induce
a positive correlation between peers, we allow for school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
and for within-class correlation of error terms. We ﬁnd strong social inter-
action eﬀects for behavior closely related to school (truanting), somewhat
weaker social interaction eﬀects for behavior partly related to school (smok-
ing, moped and cell phone ownership) and no social interaction eﬀects for
behavior far away from school (asking parents’ permission for purchases).
Intra-gender interactions are generally much stronger than cross-gender in-
teractions.1
1While the model presented in the current paper is similar in nature to the discrete
choice models of Brock and Durlauf (2000, 2001), there are some notable diﬀerences. Their
models are devised to describe aggregate behavioral outcomes in social groups in which
agents observe the choices of other individuals imperfectly. Equilibrium properties are
derived under the assumption that the number of observed choices made by others tends
to inﬁnity, and that interactions are symmetric. The present model describes the behavior
of relatively small groups of a given size in which other individuals’ choices can be assumed
to be fully observable, and allows for asymmetric interactions between individuals.
42 Discrete Choice Interactions and
Multiple Equilibria
Preliminaries
Consider a social group consisting of individuals indexed by i; i =
1,...,N. Each individual makes a binary choice denoted by yi;yi ∈{ − 1,1}.
Hence, the total number of possible choice combinations in the group is 2N.
A choice pattern is deﬁned as an element (y1,y 2,...,y N)f r o mt h es e to fa l l
possible choice combinations.
As usual in discrete choice models, we introduce a latent variable y∗
i,
which is related to the observed discrete choice variable yi by the threshold
condition yi = I(y∗
i > 0).2 Let xi be a row vector of observable exogenous
variables and β a vector of corresponding coeﬃcients to be estimated. The
latent variable is speciﬁed as the sum of a linear function of the explanatory
variables, xiβ, and an error term,  i, representing all unobserved explanatory
variables. The error term  i is assumed to be independent of all exogenous
variables.
As i m p l ec a s e
In a discrete choice model with endogenous social interactions the choices
of other individuals enter as additional explanatory variables in the speciﬁ-
cation of y∗






i = xiβ + si +  i
yi =1 i fy∗
i > 0










2I(z)=1i fz is true, and I(z)=−1o t h e r w i s e .
5for i =1 ,...,N.N o t et h a t 1
N−1
 
j =i yj is the diﬀerence between the num-
ber of individuals other than i choosing y = 1 and the number of indi-
viduals other than i choosing y = −1, as a fraction of the total number
of other individuals, N − 1.3 A positive γ reﬂects an inclination to con-
form to the behavior of others, a negative γ an inclination to deviate from
the behavior of others. Let M denote the number of individuals choosing
y = 1, i.e. M =
 N
i=1 I(yi = 1). In the sequel it appears convenient to use
 
j =iyj = M.1+( N − M).(−1) − yi =2 M − N − yi.
A choice pattern (y1,...,y N)i sa nequilibrium if and only if it is con-
sistent with (1) for all i, i.e. if after substitution of these values of yi in si,
we have y∗
i > 0 for all i with yi =1 ,a n dy∗
i ≤ 0 for all i with yi = −1. In
the model without social interactions (i.e. γ = 0) a given set of values of
xi’s,  i’s, β,a n dγ obviously deﬁnes a unique choice pattern. An important
feature of the model with social interactions is that, for a given set of values
of xi’s,  i’s, β,a n dγ, several choice patterns may be consistent with (1). As






1 = x1β + γy2 +  1
y∗
2 = x2β + γy1 +  2
yi =1 i fy∗
i > 0
yi = −1i f y∗
i ≤ 0,
for i =1 ,2. If γ =1a n dx1β + 1 = x2β + 2 = −1
2, for example, the choice
patterns (−1,−1) and (1,1) are both consistent with (2).
As noted by Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Kooreman (1994), the ﬁrst
equation in (1) and the ﬁrst and second equation in (2) can be interpreted
as reaction functions, where y∗
i is the diﬀerence between the utility person
3Earlier work on simultaneous discrete choice models has used the categorization yi ∈
{0,1} rather than yi ∈{ − 1,1}. While the diﬀerence is immaterial in a standard discrete
choice model, it is not in the present framework. With yi ∈{ − 1,1} the model is invariant
with respect to interchanging the two choices, whereas it is not with yi ∈{ 0,1}.N o t e ,
moreover, that the yj’s rather than the y
∗
j’s enter as explanatory variables – we assume
that i’s behavior is inﬂuenced by j’s actual behavior (yj) rather than by j’s “intended
behavior” (y
∗
j). For alternative speciﬁcations see, e.g., Maddala (1983).
6i derives from choosing yi = 1 and the utility he derives from choosing yi =
−1, conditional on the choices yj made by all other individuals. Equilibria
can then be interpreted as (one-shot) pure Nash equilibria of a game played
between all group members.
A more complicated model: discrete choices in school classes
Consider a set of school classes indexed by k, k =1 ,...,K.C l a s s k
has NGk girls and NBk boys. Pupils are indexed by i =1 ,...N k,w i t h
Nk = NGk + NBk.L e t MGk denote the total number of girls in class k
choosing y =1a n dMBk the total number of boys in class k choosing
y =1 . 4 For ease of exposition we will refer to y = 1 as “smoking” and








ik = xikβ + sik +  ik
yik =1 i fy∗
ik > 0






(γGG(2MGk − NGk − yik)+γGB(2MBk − NBk))/(Nk − 1) if i is a girl
(γBB(2MBk − NBk − yik)+γBG(2MGk − NGk))/(Nk − 1) if i is a boy
(Note that if i is a girl, then 2MGk − NGk − yik is the number of other
girls smoking minus the number of other girls not smoking; 2MBk − NBk is
the number of boys smoking minus the number of boys not smoking; etc..)
Thus, the model distinguishes between interactions among boys, interactions
among girls, and interactions between boys and girls. In the ﬁrst equation
in (4) γGG measures how girls are aﬀected by other girls, and γGB measures
4Obviously, one could in principle reﬁne the speciﬁcation of social groups beyond the
boy-girl distinction, for example on the basis of ethnicity, or by allowing the eﬀect of
younger and of older class mates to be diﬀerent. Such a reﬁnement is beyond the scope
of the present paper.
7how girls are aﬀected by boys; in the second equation γBB measures how
boys are aﬀected by other boys, and γBG measures how boys are aﬀected by
girls.




γGG(2MGk − NGk − yik)/(NGk − 1) + γGB(2MBk − NBk)/NBk if i is a girl
γBB(2MBk − NGk − yik)/(NBk − 1) + γBG(2MBk − NBk)/NGk if i is a boy
To appreciate the diﬀerence consider the case γGG = γGB = γBB = γBG.
Then in speciﬁcation (5) the groups of boys and girls have the same impact
on i, irrespective of their relative sizes. According to speciﬁcation (4) the
impact of a gender group increases with its relative size, which we consider
more plausible.
3 Estimation by simulation
In order to calculate the probability that a particular choice pattern will
emerge as an equilibrium, we ﬁrst reconsider the model speciﬁed in (2). For
this model we have the following conditions for the four potential equilibria:
(1,−1) ⇔ x1β − γ +  1 > 0; x2β + γ +  2 < 0,
(−1,1) ⇔ x1β + γ +  1 < 0; x2β − γ +  2 > 0,
(1,1) ⇔ x1β + γ +  1 > 0; x2β + γ +  2 > 0,
(−1,−1) ⇔ x1β − γ +  1 < 0; x2β − γ +  2 < 0.
It is easily veriﬁed that the four corresponding regions in the ( 1,  2)-
space partly overlap; see ﬁgure 1 – one of the subregions supports both
(-1,-1) and (1,1). Following Bjorn and Vuong (1984) and Kooreman (1994),
assume that in case of multiple equilibria one of them will be observed with
probability equal to one over the number of equilibria. From this assumption
and the equilibrium conditions given above it then follows that
(6)
P(1,−1) = P( 1 > −x1β + γ; 2 < −x2β − γ),
P(−1,1) = P( 1 < −x1β − γ; 2 > −x2β + γ),
P(1,1) = P( 1 > −x1β − γ; 2 > −x2β − γ) − 1
2A,
P(−1,−1) = P( 1 < −x1β + γ; 2 < −x2β + γ) − 1
2A,
8where
A = P(−x1β − γ<  1 < −x1β + γ;−x2β − γ<  2 < −x2β + γ)
(the probability mass corresponding to the shaded area in ﬁgure 1). Note
that without substracting 1
2A in P(1,1) and P(−1,−1), we would have
P(1,1) + P(1,−1) + P(−1,1) + P(−1,−1) = 1 + A>1f o rγ>0. Sub-
stracting 1
2A equally divides A between choice patterns (1,1) and (−1,−1).
This treatment of multiple equilibria ensures that the four probabilities add
up to unity, and thus that the model is statistically coherent.
We now turn to the more general case speciﬁed in (3) and (4). Sup-
pose that, for a class k, we observe a choice pattern (y1,y 2,...,y N) ≡ y
(we suppress subscript k). Then maximum likelihood estimation requires
to calculate the probability P(y) that we observe y, for any given set of
parameter values. The support in  -space for choice pattern y is
(7)
 
 i > −xiβ − si(y)i f yi =1
 i < −xiβ − si(y)i f yi = −1
Denote the region in  -space deﬁned in (7) by W(y,θ), with θ being the
parameters to be estimated. Given the independence of the  i’s, the prob-
ability that (7) is satisﬁed, P(  ∈ W(y,θ)), can be calculated straightfor-
wardly. Since W(y,θ) may also support equilibria other than y,w eh a v e
P(  ∈ W(y,θ)) ≥ P(y). In case of social groups with the size of a school
class, the procedure for determining the number of equilibria in the various
subregions of the ( 1,...,  N)-space is more complicated. First, the number
of subregions to be distinguished increases exponentially in Nk, and, sec-
ond, in each subregion we have to check in principle whether each of the
2Nk choice patterns can be an equilibrium. We therefore use a simulation
based method.
Initially, we assume ( 1,...,  N) to follow a normal distribution with zero
mean and identity covariance matrix. Consider R random draws (indexed
by r, r =1 ,...,R) from the joint distribution of ( 1,...,  N)o nW(y,θ).
9For each draw, we calculate the number of equilibria. Note that y is either
the single equilibrium or one of the multiple equilibria. Let Ωr be the set of
equilibria corresponding to draw r and let Er denote the number of elements
in Ωr (i.e. Er is the number of equilibria at draw r). Then the probability
P(y) that choice pattern y will be observed is consistently estimated by







We have found that R1 = 1000 generates estimated probabilities that
are suﬃciently precise as inputs in the maximum likelihood procedure. Note





Er ≤ 1. We also found that in our
application the probability of a single equilibrium is usually larger than





Er > 0.8. As a consequence,
our empirical results are largely insensitive with respect to the assumption
regarding the treatment of multiple equilibria. For example, maximizing a
quasi-loglikelihood based on P(  ∈ W(y,θ)) yields estimates very similar to
those based on P1(y).5








with R2 the number of draws from the joint distribution of ( 1,...,  N)o n
 N. However, this would require the number of draws to be of a much larger
magnitude to achieve the same precision as achieved when using (8).
We now provide a lemma that helps to reduce the number of potential
equilibria that have to be checked. Note ﬁrst that
 N
i=1 yi = k implies that
the number of agents with y =1i sM = 1
2(N + k).
5In a recent paper Tamer (2001) proposes a semiparametric estimator which allows -
under certain conditions - for consistent point estimation of the model in the N =2c a s e
without making assumptions regarding nonunique outcomes. While the method could in
principle be extended for estimation of the present model, one of its conditions - at least
one of the explanatory variables should have continuous support - is not satisﬁed in the
current data.
10Lemma 1: Suppose model (1) has an equilibrium with
 N
i=1 yi = k.L e t
γ ≥ 0.T h e nmax{i|yi=−1}(zi) < min{i|yi=1}(zi) −
2γ
N−1,w h e r ezi ≡ xiβ +  i.
Proof: Consider an agent i with yi = 1 and an agent j with yj = −1.
Suppose zj >z i−
2γ
N−1.T h e ny∗












since yi =1a n dyj = −1 implies y∗
i > 0 >y ∗
j, we have a contradiction.
From Lemma 1 if follows that, with γ ≥ 0, the M agents with yi =1a r e
those with the M largest values of zi. To determine whether there exists an
equilibrium with
 N
i=1 yi = k, we therefore ﬁrst rank observations on the
basis of the values of zi. Denote the ordered values as z(1) <z (2) < ... <
z(N). Then we have an equilibrium with
 N




N−1γ <... <z (N−M) + k+1
N−1γ<0 <
z(N−M+1) + k−1
N−1γ <... <z (N) + k−1
N−1γ,
with 1 ≤ M = 1
2(N +k) ≤ N −1, are satisﬁed. An equilibrium with M =0
occurs if and only if zi − γ<0 for all i; an equilibrium with M = N occurs
if and only if zi + γ>0 for all i. As a result, we only have to check N +1
out of the 2N choice patterns as possible equilibria (M =0 ,1,...,N).
Suppose that model (3)-(4), with all γ’s positive, has an equilibrium with
MGk smoking girls and MBk smoking boys. It is straightforward to show
that Lemma 1 implies that the smoking girls are those with the largest values
of zi in the subset of girls, and that the smoking boys are those with the
largest values of zi in the subset of boys. As a result, we only have to check
(NGk +1 ) ( NBk +1 )o u to ft h e2 Nk choice patterns as potential equilibria.
If one or several γ’s are negative, it is possible to have zj >z i combined
with yj = −1a n dyi = 1. This prevents a reduction of potential equilibria
similar to the procedure described above. Therefore, with negative γ’s, esti-
mation of the model requires – for each evaluation of the likelihood function,
for each simulation within a likelihood evaluation – to check all 2Nk possible
11equilibria for class k. This is computationally demanding but not infeasible
given the social group sizes in the current application.
Having calculated for each class the probability that the observed choice
pattern occurs using (8), we estimate the model by maximum likelihood.
4 The data: the Dutch National School Youth
Survey
We will estimate the model outlined in the previous sections using data from
the Dutch National School Youth Survey (NSYS) from the year 2000.6
Although in principle all pupils in a sampled class participate in the
survey, some pupils are excluded from the data. In some cases this is because
a pupil was absent when the questionnaires were ﬁlled out, in other cases
because information on some of the variables is missing. The data set used in
estimation contains information on 7534 pupils in 487 classes in 66 schools.
It contains information on the teenagers’ individual characteristics, time use,
income and expenditures, subjective information on norms and values, and
information on various behaviors and durable goods ownership. There is
only limited information on the parents (including education and working
hours) and no information on siblings. Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide sample
information at the individual level, the class level, and the school level,
respectively.
All information is self-reported. Thus, strictly speaking, our analysis
measures social interactions in how teenagers report on their behavior. The
results for “asking parents’ permission for purchases” may provide some
insight in potential diﬀerences between social interactions in reported be-
6Previous surveys were conducted in 1984, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996. The NSYS is
a joint eﬀort of the Social and Cultural Planning Oﬃce of The Netherlands (SCP) and
the Netherlands Institue for Family Finance Information (NIBUD). In each survey year
a random sample of high schools in The Netherlands is drawn. A participating school is
compensated by means of a report summarizing the survey results for that school. The
series of surveys is not a panel, although some schools have participated more than once.
12havior and in actual behavior. Asking parents for permission before making
a purchase is an aspect of out-of-class behavior. Since this primarily con-
cerns the relationship between a pupil and his or her parents, we expect
very weak or no endogenous social interaction eﬀects in this type of actual
behavior. However, if pupils copy each others’ responses to the survey ques-
tions when ﬁlling out the questionnaire, spurious social interaction eﬀects
might be found.
The vector x includes age, and dummy variables for gender, for be-
ing non-Dutch (based on the question “Do you consider yourself to be
Dutch?”), for the type of education (MAVO (lower level), HAVO (inter-
mediate level), and VWO (higher level), with ‘vocational’ as reference cat-
egory), for catholic, for protestant, and for living in a ‘single parent family’
(based on the question “Do you live in a family with father and mother?”).
Unfortunately, a large proportion of teenagers do not know their parents’
education level (41 and 36 percent for father’s and mother’s education level,
respectively). We therefore choose not to include parents’ eduation levels
as explanatory variables. However, we do include the father’s working time
and the mother’s working time (for a pupil with a single parent the working
time of the missing parent is set equal to the sample average).7
5 Empirical results
Table 4 presents four versions of the estimated model for smoking. The ﬁrst
column contains estimation results for the model without social interactions
(i.e. with γGG = γGB = γBB = γBG = 0). The probability of smoking
strongly increases in age. The eﬀect of gender is insigniﬁcant. The higher
the level of the type of education, the smaller the probability that a pupil
smokes. We also ﬁnd that pupils from single parent households and pupils
7A number of studies have reported indicators for self-esteem to be important explana-
tory variables in the analysis of teenage behavior; see e.g. Smetters and Gravelle (2001).
We choose not to include such a variable because of its potential endogeneity.
13whose mother has a paid job have a signiﬁcantly larger probability to smoke.
The variables non-Dutch, catholic, and protestant negatively aﬀect pupils’
smoking behavior. The eﬀects are largely consonant with earlier empirical
studies on smoking behavior; see for example, Gruber and Zinman (2001)
and Gruber (2001).
Column two presents results for the model with social interactions. All
social interaction coeﬃcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant. The largest
one is γBB, measuring the boy-boy interaction, followed in size by γGG,
measuring the interaction between girls. The coeﬃcients γGB and γBG,
measuring the cross gender interactions are also signiﬁcant, though smaller
in size. Note that the inclusion of the social interaction coeﬃcients hardly
aﬀects the other parameters.
Fixed eﬀects
Smoking behavior in all classes of a given school is likely to be aﬀected
by a number of unobserved school speciﬁc factors, like smoking behavior of
teachers, the school’s policy regarding smoking, and proximity of tobacco
outlets. Unobserved school speciﬁc factors may also be related to a non-
random assigment of pupils to schools. For example, parents who smoke
themselves may be less likely to send their children to a school in which
smoking is strictly prohibited. Signiﬁcant social interaction coeﬃcients may
then merely reﬂect the failure to control for these unobserved eﬀects. We
therefore also estimate a version with school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.8
The inclusion of school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects amounts to estimating 64
additional parameters (one school is reference category, another school is
deleted because it has non-smokers only). The results are reported in the
third and fourth column of table 4. While, in column four, the cross-gender
8Clearly, a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation would be obtained by allowing for class speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects. With the current data, the estimation of class speciﬁc eﬀects is infeasible.
However, below we will estimate a version with class speciﬁc random eﬀects.
14interaction eﬀects are not signiﬁcant for this speciﬁcation, the within gender
interactions are still sizeable and signiﬁcant, with again the boy-boy inter-
action being stronger than the girl-girl interaction. The other coeﬃcients
now have somewhat larger standard errors, but this has a negligible eﬀect
on the signiﬁcance of explanatory variables. More importantly, a χ2-test
shows that the ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly insigniﬁcant (p =0 .201).
We have also estimated the model for truanting, moped ownership, cell
phone ownership, and asking parents’ permission for purchases.9 Tables
5and 6 report the results without and with school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects,
respectively. (For ease of comparison the ﬁrst column in table 5repeats
the second column from table 4 and the ﬁrst column in table 6 repeats the
fourth column from table 4.)
The signiﬁcance of the ﬁxed eﬀects varies across the ﬁve types of behav-
ior. For truanting, smoking, and moped ownership the ﬁxed eﬀects are not
signiﬁcant (see bottom row of table 6), while for cell phone ownerhip and
asking parents’ permission they are signiﬁcant. The discussion of estima-
tion results below is therefore based on table 5for smoking, truanting, and
moped ownership, and on table 6 for the other two choice behaviors.
For truanting, the intra-gender eﬀects are stronger than for smoking.
Moreover, we now also have signiﬁcant cross-gender interactions. The prob-
ability of truanting sharply increases in age, is larger for non-Dutch pupils,
and decreases in the level of education. The mother’s working time also has
a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on truanting.
Moped ownership is the only type of behavior where we ﬁnd a large
9The variable ‘truanting’ in the empirical analysis is based on the question “How often
have you been truanting during the last (school)month?”. As truanters have a larger
probability of being absent when the questionnaire is being ﬁlled out, there is a potential
selection bias. The eﬀect on the estimated social interaction coeﬃcients, however, is likely
to be small. The absence of a group of truanters with strong mutual interactions might
bias the estimated γ’s towards zero, but the presence of a group on non-truanters with
strong mutual interactions will have the opposite eﬀect. Moreover, tentative calculations
indicate that the probability of a pupil truanting on a random schoolday is in the order
of one percent.
15gender eﬀect: The probability of moped ownership is much larger for boys
than for girls. It strongly increases in age (the legal minimum age for riding
a moped in The Netherlands is 16) and decreases in the level of education. It
is also the only type of behavior where we have a clear asymmetry in social
interactions between genders. For a boy, the probability of moped ownership
is strongly aﬀected by moped ownership of other boys and of girls. Moped
ownerhip for girls, on the other hand, is not aﬀected by social interactions.
For cell phone ownership we again ﬁnd an increasing eﬀect of age and a
decreasing eﬀect of education. Teenagers from a single parent family have
a much larger probability of owning a cell phone. Only the girl-girl social
interaction eﬀect is signiﬁcant.
The probability of asking parents’ permission before purchasing some-
thing strongly decreases in age, and is smaller for non-Dutch pupils and
for pupils in a single parent household. It also signiﬁcantly decreases in
mother’s working time. The four social interaction coeﬃcients are (jointly)
insigniﬁcant. This indicates that pupils do not copy each other’s responses
when ﬁlling out the questionnaire. It also indicates that the eﬀects found for
the other four types of choice behavior represent genuine endogenous social
interaction eﬀects rather than unobserved social group eﬀects.
The magnitude of the social interaction eﬀects
In order to gain some insight in the magnitude of the social interac-
tion eﬀects implied by the estimated γ’s consider a reference class (largely
based on median values of exogenous variables). This is a hypothetical
MAVO class composed of 8 girls and 8 boys; all of them are aged 14, Dutch,
non-protestant, non-catholic, and come from a two-parent household with a
father working 36 hours per week and a mother working 16 hours per week.
Using the estimated parameters from table 5, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium the
expected number of truanters is 3.14 (the probability of truanting is 0.191
16for girls and 0.201 for boys).10
Now suppose that a surely truanting girl is added to this class (i.e. we
add a girl with characteristics such that her probability of truanting is vir-
tually equal to 1, irrespective of the behavior of others). Without social
interaction eﬀects, the expected fraction of truanters would rise from 0.196
(3.14/16) to 0.244 (4.14/17), a 24 percent increase. Taking social interac-
tion eﬀects into account, the new equilibrium fraction of truanters rises to
0.278 (4.73/17), an increase of 41 percent compared to the original level.
If a surely non-truanting girl is added to this class, the expected fraction
decreases from 0.196 (3.14/16) to 0.185(3.14/17) without social interaction
eﬀects (a 6 percent decrease), and to 0.169 (2.88/17) with social interaction
eﬀects (a 16 percent decrease).
The model also implies that a change in the value of an exogenous vari-
able of only one of the pupils in principle aﬀects the behavior of all pupils
in class. Suppose, for example, that the mother of one of the girls in the
reference class increases her working hours to 46 per week. Then the equi-
librium truanting probability of her daughter increases from 0.191 to 0.210.
However, it also changes the equilibrium truanting probabilities of the other
girls (from 0.1909 to 0.1915) and boys (from 0.2002 to 0.2012). As a result,
the expected of number of truanters in class increases not only by 0.019
(0.210-0.191), but by 0.031.
Correlated within-class error terms
As an additional check on the robustness of the empirical results we also
estimated the model for smoking with a slightly more general correlation
pattern of the error terms within a class (but without school speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects). We assume the covariance matrix Σ of ( 1,...,  N)t ob ea’ o n e -
factor’ matrix such that Σ = {ρij} with ρij = ρ if i  = j and ρij =1i fi = j.
10All numbers are based on simulations with R=100000.
17To calculate the probabilities P(  ∈ W(y,θ)) we use a decomposition simu-
lator which eﬀectively depends on only a one-dimensional random variable;
cf. Stern (1992).11
We ﬁrst estimated this version without social interaction eﬀects. We
then found the estimated ρ to be small but highly signiﬁcant (ˆ ρ=0.098,
t-value 8.6, loglikelihood -2146.8) with the other parameters largely unaf-
fected. When estimating the model with social interaction eﬀects, the esti-
mated ρ is virtually equal to zero and highly insigniﬁcant, with the other
parameters being identical to those in the second column of table 4. These
results are another indication that the γ’s are measures of genuine endoge-
nous social interactions eﬀects rather than a reﬂection of unmeasured class
speciﬁc eﬀects.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The model presented and estimated in this paper represents a simple and
natural approach to incorporate endogenous social interactions in empirical
discrete choice models. In our application to teenagers’ discrete choices, we
found strong social interaction eﬀects for behavior closely related to school
(truanting), somewhat weaker social interaction eﬀects for behavior partly
related to school (smoking, moped and cell phone ownership) and no social
interaction eﬀects for behavior far away from school (asking parents’ per-
mission for purchases). The latter result suggests that the eﬀects found for
the other four types of choice behavior represent genuine endogenous social
interaction eﬀects rather than unobserved social group eﬀects.
11Let the random variables u1,...,u N,a n dv be independently normally distributed
with zero means; var(ui)=1− ρ, i =1 ,...,N and var(v)=ρ.( W er e q u i r eρ>0, the
procedure for ρ<0 is slightly diﬀerent. Note, however, that the positive deﬁniteness of
Σ implies −
1
N−1 <ρ<1.) Let  i = ui + v, i =1 ,...,N.T h e n Cov( ) = Σ, with Σ












.f(v)dv,w i t hΦ ( .) the standard normal cumulative distribution
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18While the present data set has a number of important advantages in
terms of reference group deﬁnition and information on reference group mem-
bers, the empirical results are subject to the usual qualiﬁcations regarding
inference on the basis of cross section data. The analysis of data collected
at several points in time on the same teenagers, preferably with exogenous
reassignment of pupils to other classes within the same school, would be
another step towards increasing our understanding of social interactions.
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21Figure 1: Multiple equilibria (γ>0,x 1β = x2β =0 )
22Table 1: Sample statistics at the individual level (7,534 observations)
mean median st. dev. min. max.
girl 0.5167 1.0000 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000
age 14.2520 14.0000 1.4437 11.0000 21.0000
non-Dutch 0.0881 0.0000 0.28350.0000 1.0000
single parent hh. 0.0832 0.0000 0.2762 0.0000 1.0000
MAVO 0.3211 0.0000 0.4669 0.0000 1.0000
HAVO 0.1968 0.0000 0.3976 0.0000 1.0000
VWO 0.1724 0.0000 0.3778 0.0000 1.0000
working time father 36.0284 36.0000 12.6600 0.0000 46.0000
working time mother 15.4080 16.0000 15.1320 0.0000 46.0000
catholic 0.2360 0.0000 0.4246 0.0000 1.0000
protestant 0.1856 0.0000 0.3888 0.0000 1.0000
smoking 0.0897 0.0000 0.2858 0.0000 1.0000
truanting 0.1886 0.0000 0.3912 0.0000 1.0000
asking for permission 0.8600 1.0000 0.3470 0.0000 1.0000
moped 0.0657 0.0000 0.2478 0.0000 1.0000
cell phone 0.2104 0.0000 0.4076 0.0000 1.0000
girls (3,893 observations)
smoking 0.0917 0.0000 0.2886 0.0000 1.0000
truanting 0.1811 0.0000 0.3851 0.0000 1.0000
asking for permission 0.8513 1.0000 0.3559 0.0000 1.0000
moped 0.0301 0.0000 0.1708 0.0000 1.0000
cell phone 0.2009 0.0000 0.4007 0.0000 1.0000
boys (3,641 observations)
smoking 0.0876 0.0000 0.2828 0.0000 1.0000
truanting 0.1966 0.0000 0.39750.0000 1.0000
asking for permission 0.8693 1.0000 0.3372 0.0000 1.0000
moped 0.1038 0.0000 0.3051 0.0000 1.0000
cell phone 0.22050.0000 0.4147 0.0000 1.0000
23Table 2: Sample statistics at the class level (487 observations)
mean median st. dev. min. max.
class size 15.4702 15.0000 4.6244 8.0000 30.0000
fraction of girls 0.5193 0.5238 0.1486 0.1111 0.8947
MAVO 0.3294 0.0000 0.4683 0.0000 1.0000
HAVO 0.1771 0.0000 0.3767 0.0000 1.0000
VWO 0.1643 0.0000 0.3659 0.0000 1.0000
smoking
fraction y =1
class 0.0894 0.0714 0.0946 0.0000 0.4348
girls 0.0896 0.0000 0.1249 0.0000 0.6667
boys 0.0908 0.0000 0.1328 0.0000 0.6667
truanting
fraction y =1
class 0.1884 0.1429 0.1691 0.0000 0.8000
girls 0.1799 0.1250 0.2075 0.0000 1.0000
boys 0.2033 0.1667 0.2198 0.0000 1.0000
asking for permission
fraction y =1
class 0.8597 0.8750 0.1187 0.3847 1.0000
girls 0.8523 0.8750 0.1627 0.0000 1.0000
boys 0.8651 0.9091 0.1600 0.0000 1.0000
moped
fraction y =1
class 0.0662 0.0476 0.0832 0.0000 0.4167
girls 0.0287 0.0000 0.0697 0.0000 0.5000
boys 0.1068 0.0000 0.1455 0.0000 0.7500
cell phone
fraction y =1
class 0.2113 0.1818 0.1573 0.0000 0.9091
boys 0.2019 0.1667 0.1990 0.0000 1.0000
girls 0.2234 0.2000 0.2007 0.0000 1.0000
24Table 3: Sample statistics at the school level (66 observations)
mean median st. dev. min. max.
# classes 7.3030 6.0000 6.4664 2.0000 48.0000
# pupils 113.2273 88.0000 98.8511 17.0000 698.0000
fraction of girls 0.5201 0.5175 0.0710 0.3200 0.7647
smoking
fraction y =1
class 0.1018 0.09350.05 27 0.0000 0.2400
girls 0.0997 0.09377 0.0650 0.0000 0.3200
boys 0.1041 0.0923 0.0712 0.0000 0.3333
truanting
fraction y =1
class 0.2021 0.1740 0.1291 0.0000 0.6552
girls 0.2000 0.19050.1392 0.0000 0.785 7
boys 0.20650.1786 0.1467 0.0000 0.75 00
asking for permission
fraction y =1
class 0.8479 0.8537 0.0790 0.5862 1.0000
girls 0.8353 0.8539 0.0927 0.5000 1.0000
boys 0.8585 0.8714 0.0908 0.6250 1.0000
moped
fraction y =1
class 0.07050.0691 0.0468 0.0000 0.2414
girls 0.0334 0.0306 0.0360 0.0000 0.1786
boys 0.1119 0.1052 0.0876 0.0000 0.5000
cell phone
fraction y =1
class 0.07050.0691 0.0468 0.0000 0.2414
boys 0.0334 0.0307 0.0360 0.0000 0.1786
girls 0.1119 0.1052 0.0876 0.0000 0.5000
25Table 4: Estimation results; smoking (t-values in parentheses)
with ﬁxed eﬀects
no SI with SI no SI with SI
constant -4.18 -3.16 -3.84 -3.41
(-19.1) (-10.2) (-11.6) (-8.5)
girl 0.039 0.004 -0.005-0.034
(0.9) (0.0) (0.1) (-0.1)
age 0.189 0.156 0.169 0.158
(12.3) (8.3) (7.4) (6.5)
non-Dutch -0.274 -0.248 -0.214 -0.215
(-3.3) (-2.8) (-2.0) (-2.0)
single parent family 0.188 0.183 0.170 0.176
(2.8) (2.7) (2.2) (2.3)
MAVO 0.173 0.148 0.269 0.233
(3.6) (2.3) (3.1) (2.4)
HAVO -0.042 -0.034 -0.110 -0.087
(-0.7) (-0.5) (-1.2) (-0.8)
VWO -0.238 -0.194 -0.308 -0.268
(-3.8) (-2.4) (-2.9) (-2.3)
father’s working time 0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.002
(1.0) (1.0) (0.7) (0.8)
mother’s working time 0.004 0.0050.005 0.005
(3.3) (3.2) (3.3) (3.2)
catholic -0.197 -0.174 -0.160 -0.162
(-4.1) (-3.3) (-2.3) (-2.3)
protestant -0.136 -0.126 -0.167 -0.158
(-2.4) (-1.9) (-1.8) (-1.7)
γBB — 0.880 — 0.491
(4.7) (2.3)
γBG — 0.533 — 0.223
(2.1) (0.8)
γGB — 0.569 — 0.188
(2.6) (0.8)
γGG — 0.765— 0.386
(4.6) (1.9)
log-likelihood function -2153.9 -2107.2 -2133.8 2097.2
26Table 5: Estimation results (t-values in parentheses)
smoking truanting moped cell phone permission
constant -3.16 -2.74 -4.52 -2.52 4.07
(-10.2) (-9.4) (-12.8) (-11.2) (16.3)
girl 0.004 -0.024 -0.870 0.036 -0.090
(0.0) (-0.3) (-3.0) (0.4) (-0.6)
age 0.156 0.156 0.255 0.145 -0.197
(8.3) (8.1) (14.0) (9.6) (-13.4)
non-Dutch -0.248 0.127 -0.178 0.142 -0.159
(-2.8) (1.9) (-1.9) (2.3) (-2.5)
single parent family 0.183 0.037 -0.034 0.277 -0.246
(2.7) (0.6) (-0.4) (5.0) (-4.2)
MAVO 0.148 0.094 -0.131 0.039 -0.107
(2.3) (1.5) (-1.9) (0.7) (-2.0)
HAVO -0.034 0.131 -0.215-0.072 -0.140
(-0.5) (1.7) (-2.9) (-1.2) (-2.4)
VWO -0.194 0.048 -0.408 -0.254 -0.042)
(-2.4) (0.6) (-4.5) (-3.5) (-0.6)
father’s working time 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(1.0) (-0.2) (1.2) (-1.1) (-2.6)
mother’s working time 0.0050.003 0.003 0.002 -0.004
(3.2) (2.1) (1.6) (1.8) (-2.7)
catholic -0.174 -0.126 0.0103 -0.019 0.233
(-3.3) (-2.6) (0.2) (-0.4) (5.0)
protestant -0.126 -0.117 -0.083 -0.280 0.273
(-1.9) (-2.2) (-1.1) (-5.0) (5.1)
γBB 0.880 0.829 0.486 0.562 0.303
(4.7) (6.8) (2.4) (5.1) (2.1)
γBG 0.533 0.535 0.497 0.434 0.082
(2.1) (3.5) (2.0) (2.8) (0.5)
γGB 0.569 0.465 0.346 0.467 0.128
(2.6) (2.9) (1.1) (2.7) (0.8)
γGG 0.7651.171 0.15 3 0.830 0.220
(4.6) (10.3) (0.6) (8.2) (2.0)
log-likelihood function -2133.8 -3254.6 -1586.9 -3599.9 -2832.7
2
7Table 6: Estimation results; with school speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (t-values in parentheses)
smoking truanting moped cell phone permission
constant -3.41 -2.92 -5.40 -3.34 4.39
(-8.5) (-8.1) (-12.8) (-11.7) (13.7)
girl -0.034 -0.024 -0.824 0.028 -0.094
(-0.1) (-0.3) (-2.8) (0.3) (-0.6)
age 0.158 0.158 0.282 0.189 -0.207
(6.5) (7.1) (11.4) (11.0) (-11.5)
non-Dutch -0.2150.125 -0.175 0.05 1 -0.183
(-2.0) (1.7) (-1.4) (0.7) (-2.5)
single parent family 0.176 0.036 -0.036 0.249 -0.227
(2.3) (0.5) (-0.4) (4.0) (-3.4)
MAVO 0.233 0.198 -0.136 0.018 -0.196
(2.4) (2.2) (-1.2) (0.3) (-2.4)
HAVO -0.087 0.118 -0.161 -0.184 -0.161
(-0.8) (1.2) (-1.4) (-2.5) (-1.9)
VWO -0.268 0.002 -0.394 -0.463 -0.021)
(-2.3) (0.0) (-3.2) (-5.6) (-0.2)
father’s working time 0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.004
(0.8) (-0.2) (1.2) (-0.5) (-2.6)
mother’s working time 0.0050.003 0.003 0.002 -0.004
(3.2) (2.0) (1.8) (1.8) (-2.6)
catholic -0.162 -0.106 -0.030 -0.056 0.2000
(-2.3) (-1.8) (-0.4) (-1.1) (3.4)
protestant -0.158 -0.159 -0.210 -0.228 0.255
(-1.7) (-2.4) (-1.8) (-3.1) (3.3)
γBB 0.491 0.829 0.197 -0.099 -0.156
(2.3) (6.8) (0.9) (-0.8) (-1.0)
γBG 0.223 0.359 0.101 -0.148 -0.317
(0.8) (2.2) (0.4) (-1.0) (-1.6)
γGB 0.188 0.277 0.044 -0.191 -0.298
(0.8) (1.6) (0.1) (-1.2) (-1.6)
γGG 0.386 1.023 -0.140 0.244 -0.205
(1.9) (8.0) (-0.4) (2.2) (-1.4)
log-likelihood function -2097.2 -3220.2 -1563.8 -3500.9 -2782.04
Signiﬁcance ﬁxed eﬀects 0.201 0.286 0.9450.000 0.002
(p-values)
2
8